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Abstract
In the joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (C-92/09) and Hartmut Eifert 
(C-93/09) v. Land Hessen Judgment of 9 November 2010, not yet published,1 the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Court of Justice) was called upon to balance the right to respect of private life in 
general, and to the protection of personal data in particular, protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), against the principle of transparency stated 
in Articles 1 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in Article 15 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The Court of Justice approached this problem within the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 TFEU. This reference, however, took the form of an indirect challenge to certain EU 
law provisions that, in the view of the applicants, violated the right to respect of private life and of the 
protection of personal data. 
In this analysis the method of the Court of Justice when balancing diverging or even opposing interests 
protected by EU law will be scrutinised. The authors are critical of the Court’s reasoning, which they 
consider put too little weight on the fundamental interest of transparency in the case at hand. The 
analysis is structured as follows. First, in section 1, the arguments of the Applicants and the respondent 
State respectively will be summarised, followed by the main reasoning of the Court. In section 2, the 
question of how to balance fundamental rights and general interests will be analysed, taking as the point 
of departure the question of proportionality as described by the Court. The conclusions are presented 
in the final section 3.
1  The facts and proceedings of the case
1.1  The Applicants and the   
respondent State
The applicants in the main proceedings, Volker 
und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert (the 
Applicants), were a legal partnership in the business 
of agriculture and a full-time farmer, respectively. In 
2008, the Applicants had applied for, and later received, 
financial aid from the European Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD). The EAGF and the 
EARFD were funds set up by the European Union for 
the purposes of its common agricultural policy.
PAGE 2 . EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 2011:7
While their applications were pending, the Applicants 
brought proceedings against the Land of Hesse 
(Germany) before the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden, 
requesting that the Land of Hesse be ordered to 
refrain from, or to be prohibited from, transmitting or 
publishing their names, their place of establishment or 
residence, the postcode of that place, and the amount 
of aid received. Such data on recipients of funds from 
the EAGF and the EARFD was published annually on 
an internet website, pursuant to Articles 42(8b) and 44a 
of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1290/2005 of 21 June 
2005 on the financing of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1437/2007 of 26 November 2007, and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 259/2008 of 18 March 2008 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Regulation 
No. 1290/2005 (…). The website also provided a search 
tool for consultation of the data published.
In each case, the application form for the funds from 
the EAGF and the EARFD contained a statement 
indicating the applicant’s awareness that the relevant 
regulations required publication of information on the 
beneficiaries of the funds and the amounts received per 
beneficiary, to be effected annually at the latest by 31 
March the following year.
The Applicants argued that the publication of such data 
relating to them was not justified by overriding public 
interests. The Land of Hesse, on its part, conceded that 
it was obliged under EU law to publish the data at issue, 
but undertook not to publish the amounts received by 
the Applicants.2 The Land of Hesse also argued that the 
publication of data could not constitute an interference 
with the private life of the Applicants, as they had 
been informed of it in the application form and had 
given their consent to publication by submitting their 
applications.
Under these circumstances, the Verwaltungsgericht 
Wiesbaden came to question the validity of the EU 
regulations at issue, as it held that the contested 
publication of data relating to the Applicants constituted 
an unjustified interference with the fundamental right 
to the protection of personal data. Therefore, the 
Verwaltungsgericht decided to stay proceedings and 
refer a number of questions to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling. For the purposes of this 
policy analysis, we will focus on the perceived conflict 
between the values of respect for private life, on the 
one hand, and the general interest of transparency, on 
the other hand. The Court addressed this problem in its 
answer to the question as to whether the EU regulations 
at issue were valid.3 
1.2  The reasoning of the European Court of 
Justice
The Court of Justice recognised that the right to respect 
of private life in general, and to the protection of 
personal data in particular, was protected by Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter. However, the Court further 
observed that these rights were not absolute, but must 
be considered in relation to their function in society. 
This holding has since been cited in Case C-543/09 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Judgment of 5 May 2011, not yet published, para 51. 
In particular, the Court recognised that Article 52(1) 
accepted limitations to the rights set forth in Articles 7 
and 8, insofar as such limitations were provided for by 
law, respected the essence of those rights and, subject 
to the principle of proportionality, were necessary and 
genuinely met objectives of general interest recognised 
by the European Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.
The Court of Justice continued to examine whether 
the Union provisions at issue interfered with the rights 
guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and if so, 
whether that interference was justified having regard to 
Article 52 of the Charter.
In that regard, the Court of Justice recognised that the 
amounts received by beneficiaries from the EAGF and 
the EAFRD represented part of their income, often a 
considerable part. As the names of beneficiaries and 
the amounts received were made available to third 
parties by publication on a website, the Court held 
that such publication constituted an interference with 
the private life of beneficiaries within the meaning of 
Article 7 of the Charter. The Court also held that the 
publication of data pursuant to the Union provisions 
at issue was not based on the consent of beneficiaries.4 
2 Schecke, para 29.
3 Other questions referred by the Verwaltungsgericht mainly concerned the compatibility of the contested publication of data    
 with Directive 95/46/EC (the so-called Data Protection Directive).
4  The Court does not elaborate the matter of consent any further, as AG Sharpston does. She argues that     
“significant economic duress sufficed to render the consent non-voluntary”, see Opinion of 17 June 2010, paras 82–85.
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Furthermore, the Court noted, the application form 
only contained a statement of awareness. Therefore, 
the Court concluded, the contested publication of data 
constituted an interference with the rights recognised 
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.5
Thus, the Court of Justice proceeded to examine 
whether this interference was justified having regard 
to Article 52(1) of the Charter. Under that Article, the 
exercise of rights such as those protected by Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter could be limited, as long as the 
limitations were provided for by law, respected the 
essence of those rights and freedoms, and, subject to 
the principle of proportionality, were necessary and 
genuinely met objectives of general interest recognised 
by the European Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.
Firstly, the Court of Justice held that it was common 
ground that the interference with the rights guaranteed 
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter caused by the Union 
provisions at issue was provided for by law.6
Secondly, the Court recognised that the EU regulations 
at issue were intended to serve the general interest 
of transparency stated in Articles 1 and 10 TEU and 
in Article 15 TFEU, contributing, inter alia, to the 
appropriate use of public funds. Hence, the Court held, 
the Union provisions at issue pursued an objective of 
general interest recognised by the European Union.7
Thirdly, with regard to proportionality, the Court 
recalled relevant case law according to which 
derogations and limitations in relation to the protection 
of personal data must apply only insofar as was strictly 
necessary.8 The Court recognised that taxpayers had the 
right to be kept informed of the use of public funds, 
but maintained that to strike a proper balance between 
the conflicting interests involved it was necessary to 
ascertain whether publication on a website of the 
names of beneficiaries and the amounts received did 
not go beyond what was necessary for achieving the 
legitimate aims pursued. This involved, in particular, 
having regard in particular to the interference with the 
rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 
In this context, the Court noted that publication was 
effected with no distinction with regard, e.g., to the 
duration, frequency, nature, or amount of aid received.9
With regard to natural persons, the Court held that 
it had not been shown that the Council and the 
Commission had sought to strike such a balance, or that 
they had taken into consideration alternative methods 
of publishing information. The Court envisaged ways 
of publishing data in a limited manner, providing 
citizens with a sufficiently accurate image of the aid 
granted by the EAGF and the EAFRD while at the 
same time causing less interference with the right to 
respect of private life, which appeared not to have 
been examined. Therefore, the Court concluded, the 
Council and the Commission had exceeded the limits 
which compliance with the principle of proportionality 
imposed with regard to the publication of data relating 
to natural persons.10
With regard to legal persons, the Court of Justice 
recalled that legal persons could claim the protection 
of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter insofar as the official 
title of the legal person identifies one or more natural 
persons. The Court held that this was the case with 
regard to Volker und Markus Schecke GbR. However, 
the Court also observed that legal persons were already 
subject to a more onerous obligation in respect of the 
publication of data relating to them. Furthermore, 
the Court held that it would impose an unreasonable 
administrative burden on the competent national 
authorities if they were obliged to ascertain for each legal 
person whether the name of that person identified natural 
persons. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Union 
provisions at issue struck a fair balance in consideration 
of the respective interests at issue with regard to the 
publication of data relating to legal persons.11
5 Schecke, para 64.
6 Schecke, para 66.
7 Schecke, para 68.
8 Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy [2008] ECR I-9831, para 56. This case is  
 hereinafter referred to as Satamedia.
9 Schecke, paras 77, 79–81.
10 Schecke, para 86.
11 Schecke, para 87.
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On those grounds, the Court of Justice ruled that the 
EU law provisions at issue were invalid insofar as, 
with regard to natural persons who were beneficiaries 
of EAGF and EAFRD aid, those provisions imposed 
an obligation to publish personal data relating to each 
beneficiary without drawing a distinction based on 
relevant criteria such as the periods during which those 
persons had received such aid, the frequency of such 
aid or the nature and amount thereof.12
2  What fundamental rights and 
 for whom?
2.1 Introduction
The summary above shows the Court of Justice 
interpreting and applying the Charter, even though 
the facts of the case referred to events occurring in 
September 2008. The Charter entered into force on 1 
December 2009 and at the time when the Applicants 
brought proceedings before the national court, it was 
uncertain whether or not the Charter would become 
legally binding. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice 
was satisfied with interpreting Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter – together with the clause of limitations 
of rights stated by Article 52(1) – and did not move 
beyond these articles. As we shall see, the Court’s 
choice of focusing on these articles rather than putting 
the factual circumstances of the case into a broader 
context of the proper application of the Charter raises 
issues on the future role and internal structure of the 
Charter. Some of these issues will be addressed below.
The role of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 
ECHR) and the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) will be 
highlighted in this analysis. The Court of Justice 
referred to case law of the Strasbourg Court when it 
defined the right to a private life with regard to the 
processing of personal data and as support for its 
application of the proportionality test in the present. 
However, just as there are important articles of the 
Charter that the Court chose not to consider further, 
there is important case law of the Strasbourg Court that 
the Court of Justice did not take into account. We will 
return to these questions later, after having a closer 
look into the issue of proportionality.
2.2  The question of proportionality 
 – the point of departure
In this indirect judicial review of the EU law provisions 
at issue, the Court of Justice used a particular 
proportionality test. Traditionally, when EU measures 
have been reviewed by the Court, the so-called 
“manifestly inappropriate test” has been used.13 This 
test is comparatively lenient, as it seeks to respect the 
discretion of the Union legislature unless the Court 
considers the contested measure to be manifestly 
inappropriate to achieve its objectives. The same 
test has generally applied when national authorities 
implement EU law, whereas a stricter proportionality 
test has generally applied when the Court has reviewed 
measures by Member States affecting any of the 
fundamental freedoms.14 
When applying the “manifestly inappropriate test”, the 
Court will review the suitability and necessity of the 
Union measure.15 In cases where the Union measure has 
entailed a policy choice, the notion of “necessity” has 
been linked to an assessment including, in the words 
of Takis Tridimas, “some notion of reasonableness or 
arbitrary conduct”.16 In other instances, the necessity 
test has rather involved an assessment of whether 
there were any less restrictive alternatives available.17 
In Schecke, the Court of Justice seems to use such a 
test. However, in the “manifestly inappropriate test”, 
the applicant will have the (heavy) onus of proving that 
there is an equally effective alternative.18 In Schecke, 
the onus seems to have been shifted. 
As mentioned in the summary above, the Court of Justice 
held that derogations and limitations in relation to the 
protection of personal data must apply only insofar as 
is strictly necessary, citing Satamedia.19 The latter case 
revolved around a Finnish publication, which inter alia 
disclosed the surnames and annual income of some 1.2 
million Finnish taxpayers. In Schecke, the Court cited 
a paragraph in Satamedia which concerns derogations 
from the right to privacy in general, and protection of 
personal data in particular, under Article 9 of the Data 
12 Schecke, paras 80–82.
13  Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, p 138 with references.
14 Tridimas, op.cit. For an early example in case law, see case 104/75 de Peijper [1976] ECR 613.
15  Tridimas, op.cit., p 144. Tridimas acknowledges that emphasis can shift between the elements of suitability and necessity, pp 146–147.
16 Tridimas, op.cit., p 146.
17 Tridimas, op.cit., p 146 with references.
18 Tridimas, op.cit., pp 147–148.
19  Case C-73/07, above n 8. In Schecke, paras 77 and 86, the Court of Justice cited Satamedia para 56.
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Protection Directive.20 Under Article 9, Member States 
are allowed to “provide for exemptions or derogations 
from [certain provisions of the Directive designed to 
protect personal data] for the processing of personal 
data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or 
the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if 
they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy 
with the rules governing freedom of expression”. In 
Satamedia, then, the Court adjusted the “necessary” of 
Article 9 into a “strictly necessary”, for the purposes of 
balancing freedom of expression against the protection 
of personal data to ascertain whether Finland had 
superseded its discretion under Article 9. The Court 
held that Finland had not superseded its discretion.
For the purposes of this analysis, it is noticed that 
Satamedia concerned national law derogating from 
the right to protection of personal data, embodied in 
an EU instrument (i.e., the Data Protection Directive), 
whereas in Schecke an EU instrument was challenged 
on the grounds that it violated the right to protection 
of personal data. From the traditional perspective, we 
would expect the “manifestly inappropriate test” to 
apply in Schecke, and a more intense proportionality 
review to apply in Satamedia. From that perspective, 
it is somewhat surprising to find the Court of Justice 
in Schecke citing Satamedia in order to transplant a 
“strictly necessary” criterion from one area of EU law 
to another.
2.3  Fundamental rights and the tension 
between transparency and privacy
2.3.1 Privacy as a fundamental right
Such a perspective, however, neglects the growing 
impact of fundamental rights in EU law. The 
proportionality test used by the Court of Justice in 
Schecke was, explicitly, the test enacted in Article 
52(1) of the Charter.21 The new element introduced by 
the Court was that “necessary” should be interpreted 
as “strictly necessary” – mirroring its approach in 
Satamedia. Both cases concerned derogations from the 
right to respect of private life in general, and to the 
protection of personal data in particular, as protected 
by EU law (under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and 
under the Data Protection Directive, respectively). 
The major difference between the two cases, from a 
fundamental rights perspective, is not the formality 
that they represent challenges to EU law or national 
law, respectively, but that in Satamedia the Court of 
Justice was called upon to balance two fundamental 
rights, whereas in Schecke it was called upon to balance 
a fundamental right against an objective of general 
interest. In the former case, the right to protection of 
personal data had to give way to freedom of expression, 
but in the latter case it prevailed over the general 
interest of transparency.
Hypothetically, the Court of Justice took the view 
that there was only one fundamental right (the right 
to private life in general and to protection of personal 
data in particular) at stake in Schecke, making it easier 
to have recourse to a “strictly necessary test”. Such an 
approach would at a first glance mirror the approach 
of the Strasbourg Court to any limitation of Article 8 
of the ECHR: it must be in accordance with law and 
necessary in a democratic society.22
However, such a hypothesis also raises further 
questions. First of all, Article 8 ECHR has its own 
structure and has been interpreted in a very wide, 
almost divergent, case law. Secondly, by referring to the 
approach taken by the Strasbourg Court in limitations 
of rights – especially regarding Article 8 ECHR – one 
should not forget that the latter Court has developed a 
detailed and fine reasoning. According to the wording 
of Article 8(2), the interference must be “necessary 
in a democratic society”, that is, the rule of law must 
be respected and arbitrary behaviour by the State 
must be avoided.23 The justification for the restricting 
measure should be narrowly interpreted. The concept 
of margin of appreciation forms an important part of 
the last criterion – “necessary in a democratic society” 
– and the Strasbourg Court has stated that it implies 
that the interference should correspond to a “pressing 
social need” and be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.24 A number of factors in the specific case 
20  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals   
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
21  Schecke, para 65. At the time of the ruling of the Court of Justice in Satamedia, the Charter had not yet been elevated to its present 
status as primary EU law (cf. Article 6(1) TEU). However, the increasing importance of fundamental rights, as expressed in the Charter, 
in the case law of the Court dates back to 2002, at least. See Tridimas, op.cit., p 138 with references, and Paul Craig, The ECJ and ultra 
vires action: A conceptual analysis, Common Market Law Review, vol 48, 2011, pp 395–437, at pp 430–433.
22  Moreover, the Strasbourg Court would have had to consider the right to freedom of expression, stated in Article 10 ECHR,   
as discussed below in Section 2.3.2.
23 Silver and others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983, paras 88–89.
24 Iain Cameron, An Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights, 5th ed, Iustus förlag, 2011, p 111.
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decide how great the discretion of the State will be. 
We can thus conclude that the transplant of “strictly 
necessary” from Satamedia to some extent could be 
explained by the connection to the ECHR but at the 
same time it is used in a way that could be – from the 
perspective of the ECHR – contra productive and alien 
to the systematic and teleological line of argumentation 
developed by the Strasbourg Court.
Privacy is a broad concept, including inter alia the 
right to personal autonomy, i.e., the right to develop 
one’s personality, and also “freedom from prying” by 
the State or third parties.25 The Strasbourg Court has 
repeatedly stated that the concept of “private life” 
is a very broad term for which one cannot create an 
exhaustive definition.26 Article 8 ECHR covers not only 
the private life of individuals, but also their professional 
or business life,27 and even the “privacy” of legal 
persons.28 The object and purpose of Article 8 ECHR is 
to protect the individual against arbitrary interference 
by the public authorities.29 Excluded from the scope 
of Article 8 ECHR is the processing and disclosure 
of personal data which is not private in itself and not 
systematically stored with a focus on the data subject, 
and where the data subject could reasonably expect 
the processing or disclosure.30 The Strasbourg Court 
has ruled in cases of data protection under Article 8 
ECHR and has interpreted the concept of “private life” 
broadly within the context of the Council of Europe’s 
Data Protection Convention,31 which was the source of 
inspiration to the Data Protection Directive.32
In EU law, a distinction can be made between privacy 
and data protection which is shown, for example, as they 
do not form one sole right according to the articles of 
the Charter.33 And in primary law, as the Lisbon Treaty 
has entered into force, data protection is now part of the 
provisions having general application.34 Article 8 ECHR 
is reproduced in Article 7 of the Charter, while Article 
8 of the Charter has no equivalent in the ECHR. But 
as we have seen, data protection is to some extent part 
of the right to privacy according to Article 8 ECHR. 
This interrelationship of the right to privacy and the 
protection of personal data has been recognised by 
the Court of Justice as it has held that the processing 
of personal data liable to infringe the right to privacy 
must be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR.35 
However, the two systems are not entirely parallel to 
each other. The scope of the Data Protection Directive 
can also be broader than the scope of Article 8 ECHR. 
Under Article 6 of the Directive, personal data may 
only be processed when the purpose of collecting it is 
specified, explicit and legitimate. When the purpose is 
defined, only the data that is necessary for achieving 
the purpose may be gathered and it should not be 
stored longer than necessary for the purpose to be 
achieved. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive, 
the person concerned (the data subject) has the right to 
be informed, to have access to his or her own personal 
data, and also the right to object to the processing of the 
data.36 Situations can therefore arise where disclosure 
of information falls outside the scope of privacy 
protection but within the scope of data protection.37
25  Peter Oliver, The protection of privacy in the economic sphere before the European Court of Justice,     
Common Market Law Review, vol 46, 2009, pp 1443–1483, at p 1443.
26 Cf. Pretty v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 29 April 2002, para 61.
27 Rotaru v. Romania, Judgment of 4 May 2000.
28  Niemitz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992; Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 February 2005 ;   
Comingersoll v. Portugal, Judgment of 6 April 2000.
29 Niemitz v. Germany, paras 29 and 31.
30  Herke Kranenborg, Access to documents and data protection in the European Union: on the public nature of personal data,   
Common Market Law Review, vol 45, 2008, pp 1079–1114 at p 1093.
31  Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981 (ETS, No. 108). 
See also Z v. Finland, Judgment of 25 February 1997.
32 Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with 
 regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, concerns the 
 processing of personal data by EU institutions and bodies and has thus a close link to Directive 95/46.
33 Kranenborg, op.cit., p 1089.
34 Article 16 TFEU.
35 Joined Cases C-465/00, 138 and 139, Österreischischer Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-4989, paras 68–69.
36  These rights are now also granted by Article 8 of the Charter and, with regard to processing of personal data by the institutions of the 
European Union, by Regulation 45/2001, Article 4. The processing of certain sensitive data, such as data concerning racial or ethnic ori-
gin, health, or sex life, is in principle prohibited under Article 8 of the Data Protection Directive. See also Kranenborg, op. cit., p 1086.
37  In Case T-194/04 Bavarian Lager Company Ltd. v. Commission [2007] ECR II-4523, appealed in Case C-28/08 P Bavarian Lager, Judg-
ment of 29 June 2010, not yet published, the Union Courts addressed these issues when balancing Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents against Regulation 45/2001.
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In Schecke the Court of Justice criticised the EU 
institutions for not paying enough attention to the 
requirement that legislation allowing the publication of 
personal data should be in line with the aims underlying 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.38 The interpretation 
takes EU law alone into consideration, hence not giving 
attention to the arguments put forward by the institutions 
and the intervening Member States.39 It seems that the 
core question for the Court was the fact that the EU 
institutions had not sufficiently examined or explained 
how the publication of the personal data of recipients 
could be avoided or limited in order to meet the 
requirements of Articles 7 and 8.40
2.3.2  Access to information as a fundamental 
right – a question of legitimacy
Several legislative acts of the EU aim at giving access 
to EU documents in order to strengthen aspects of 
legitimacy and democracy in the Union.41 Furthermore, 
transparency in the sense of access to information and 
access to documents is enacted in Articles 11(1) and 
42 of the Charter.42 Therefore, it can be argued that 
transparency, in this sense, which corresponds to the 
situation in Schecke, is as much a fundamental right 
as the right to protection of personal data. It is here 
suggested that the balancing performed in Schecke 
awarded too little weight to transparency. However, 
Articles 11(1) and 42 of the Charter, on freedom of 
expression including the right to information and the 
right to access to EU documents, respectively, were 
not even mentioned by the Court of Justice in Schecke. 
Thus, we remain uncertain as to whether transparency 
should rightly be regarded as a fundamental right of EU 
citizens under the Charter. 
Once again, a closer study of the case law of the 
Strasbourg Court adds to the overall picture. Later 
developments in the case law of the Strasbourg Court 
indicate that openness and access to documents do form 
a part of the freedom of expression granted by Article 
10 ECHR in a new way.43 In order for the freedom of 
expression to be effective (to give information and 
viewpoints to other), it is inevitably necessary to have 
access to information.44 In the ECHR, no explicit 
reference to a right to access to public documents is 
made, but such a right is included in Article 10 and 
in Article 8 concerning access to personal data.45 
Both rights can of course be limited according to the 
conditions set up in the second paragraph of each 
Article.46 For decades, the Strasbourg Court has stated 
that political expression, which includes any expression 
on matters of public interest,47 has a higher level of 
protection than other expressions covered by Article 
10. Article 11(1) of the Charter is intended to have the 
same content as Article 10 ECHR and the silence of the 
Court of Justice on this point is thus regrettable.
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice did mention Articles 
1 and 10 TEU and 15 TFEU in Schecke, even though 
the Court did not develop its reasoning further. These 
articles stress openness (Article 1 TEU), participation 
in the democratic life of the Union (Article 10(3) 
TEU), and the right to access to documents in the 
Union (Article 15(3) TFEU). Following the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, transparency and openness have gained 
a clearer position in EU law,48 as well as in several 
Member States.49 The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced 
the right to access to documents in Article 255 TEC as 
part of the “provisions common to several institutions”. 
38 Schecke, paras 81, 83 and 85.
39 Schecke, para 78.
40 Schecke, para 81.
41  Dariusz Adamski, How wide is “the widest possible”? Judicial interpretation of the exceptions to the right of access to official  
documents revisited, Common Market Law Review, vol 46, 2009, pp 521–549. The starting point for the recognition of the right  
of access to documents was Declaration 17 annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, which eventually lead to the new Article 255 in  
the EC Treaty when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. With reference to this article, Regulation 1049/2001 entered  
into force on 3 December 2001.
42  Cf. also Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, pp 350–351; and Regulation 1049/2001.
43  Társág a szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Judgment of 14 April 2009, para 35 with reference to 
 Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic, Decision of 10 July 2006.
44  Thomas Bull, The right stuff? On the transformation of the protection of rights, in: Fabian Amtenbrink, and , Peter A. J. van den Berg, 
(Eds), The Constitutional Integrity of the European Union, TMC Asser Press, 2010, pp 175–200, at pp 189–190.
45 Cf Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, Judgment of 6 June 2006.
46 Cf Leander v. Sweden, Judgment of 26 March 1987. One should also note that from a Swedish perspective, the main rule is for more  
 openness and wider accessibility to information than is the case in both the European legal orders.
47  Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 February 2005, para 88; Niemitz v. Germany, 
 Judgment of 16 December 1992, para 31.
48  Kranenborg, op.cit., p 1087.
49  Lenaerts, and Gutiérrez-Fons, op.cit., p 1656. See also Kranenborg, op. cit., p 1087.
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Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, it is now included 
in Article 15 TFEU, as part of the “provisions having 
general application”.50 In Schecke, however, the Court 
held that openness does not automatically prevail 
over the right to protection of personal data, even in 
cases where considerable amounts of money are at 
stake.51 That holding suggests a limited impact for the 
general interest of transparency, and right to access to 
information; at least when balanced against the rights 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
Issues of openness and transparency with regard to 
the political institutions of the European Union have 
been scrutinised on several occasions by the courts 
of the EU.52 In Borax,53 for example, the General 
Court suggested that the right to privacy of experts, 
contributing in political decision-making, could serve 
as basis for limiting the right of the public to insight 
and access to information, provided that a disclosure 
of the information at issue would concretely and 
effectively undermine the decision-making process.54 
Unfortunately, the General Court did not mention 
that such experts are officially appointed to serve the 
public, i.e., EU citizens and others. Here, a potential 
conflict with the Strasbourg case law can be detected. 
According to the Strasbourg Court, it is clear that the 
interest of open debate prevails over the right of an 
official servant to a private life.55
From a more practical perspective, Schecke also points 
at the challenges that a modern democracy faces with 
regard to new technologies and the Internet. In her 
Opinion in Schecke, AG Sharpston pointed out that the 
Internet is today the “obvious medium of publication”.56 
Here another conflict appears; while striving to protect 
the privacy of individuals, the democratic aspect today 
is different from what it was ten years ago. The fact 
that many people use the Internet as their main (and 
often only) source of information might, in a wider 
perspective, be an important matter to take into account 
when handling privacy regulations.57
Thus, transparency is an important means of 
guaranteeing efficient control over the exercise of public 
power, in general, and over the work of officials serving 
the people, in particular.58 It is also an utterly important 
tool for ensuring that the rule of law is respected, and 
enhanced, by the institutions of the Union. In this 
context, there is a tendency in the case law of the 
General Court that to some extent differs from the Court 
of Justice. On several occasions, the former has not 
hesitated to suggest that the right of access to documents 
is a fundamental right,59 while the Court of Justice, so 
far, has avoided characterising it as such.60 The General 
Court has thus paid more attention to the importance of 
access to information.61 Such attention from the Court 
of Justice as well, mirroring the developments in the 
Treaties since Amsterdam, would be most welcome.
2.3.3  An alternative approach, and future 
issues within the field of fundamental 
rights
Another issue of interest in this case is what role the 
concept of the State’s margin of appreciation developed 
by the Strasbourg Court could play when the Court of 
Justice has to balance two fundamental rights against 
each other. The concept of margin of appreciation 
forms an important part of deciding the limits of the 
criterion “necessary in a democratic society” and thus 
what is to be considered a “pressing social need”.62 
In Schecke, the Court of Justice avoids taking these 
concerns into account.
If the Court of Justice had argued that the general interest 
of transparency entailed a fundamental right to access 
to information and documents, Schecke would have 
concerned the balancing of two conflicting fundamental 
rights. As the Court chose another approach, it lost 
its opportunity to give new guidance on the pressing 
EU law issue of how to balance conflicting rights in 
the Charter, and whether there is a hierarchy of rights 
within the Charter. Furthermore, we remain uncertain 
50  Cf. The heading of Title II: ”Provisions having general application”, encompassing Articles 7 to 17 TFEU.
51  Schecke, para 85.
52  See, for example, Case C-345/06 Gottfried Heinrich, [2009] ECR I-1659.
53  Case T-121/05 Borax Europe Ltd v. European Commission, [2009] ECR II-27.
54 op.cit., para 71. Compare Bull, op.cit., p 192.
55  Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986. It is noteworthy that 40 per cent of the EU budget concerns 
 the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy.
56  Schecke, Opinion of the A.G. Sharpston of 17 June 2010, para 96.
57  It is not clear in the case how accessible the information was outside Internet, in traditional (printed) sources.
58  Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe v. Council, Judgment of 22 March 2011, not yet published, para 69.
59  Joined Cases T-3/00 and 337/04, Pitsiorlas v. Council and ECB [2007] ECR II-4779, paras 221 and 231.
60  Schecke, Opinion of the A.G. Sharpston of 17 June 2010, para 67.
61  Adamski, op.cit., p 548.
62  Cameron, op.cit., p 111.
EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 2011:7 . PAGE 9
as to how to balance rights in the Charter against rights 
in the ECHR, general principles of EU law, and rights 
conferred by the Treaties. For guidance, we must still 
return to well-known case law such as Schmidberger, 
where the fundamental right of freedom of expression 
was in conflict with the free movement of goods. In 
that case, the Court held that the underlying interests 
of the two freedoms should be balanced in order to 
reach a proportional outcome.63 The result of such a 
balancing act in Schecke, if it had been performed, 
is difficult – impossible, perhaps – to foresee. Such 
guidance in Schecke would have been desirable for 
all who are called upon to apply EU law in concrete 
cases. There is no lack of sources for inspiration for 
such guidance: Almost all Member States have in their 
national legislation specific rules handling the conflict 
between data protection and access to documents.64
The underlying interest of access to documents has 
a clear connection to democracy and is a part of the 
general interest of transparency of government. When 
citizens have the right to access documents, democratic 
legitimacy of government is assured. It also enables 
citizens to control government and assures that decision-
makers can be held accountable for their actions.65 
The right to access documents serves the general 
interest of democratic legitimacy of government. It 
enables citizens to control government and assures 
that decision-makers can be held accountable for their 
actions.66 Furthermore, to safeguard the right to access 
to documents it is important to maintain the common 
rule that one does not need to give reasons for a request 
for access to a certain document.67
The underlying interests of data protection and the right 
to private life, on the other hand, are private interests 
of personal integrity that have become more urgent in 
recent years due to the threats to integrity inherent in 
developments of information technology and social 
media. Therefore, Article 8 of the Charter also specifies 
that there must be legitimate reasons for any processing 
of personal data. 
The case law of the Strasbourg Court can be used as 
an important tool for defining the underlying principles 
and how to balance these against each other. Moreover, 
the Strasbourg Court stresses the importance of a 
certain margin of appreciation for the national courts 
and decision makers depending on the circumstances 
of the specific case. Herke Kranenborg has suggested 
a differentiated approach, in which all circumstances 
of the specific case are considered, submitting that the 
more the disclosure of the personal data contributes to 
a strong and current public debate, the more necessary 
it is to make a test of overriding public interest. He 
proposes that such a test should be included in the EU 
legislation on data protection in order to open up for a 
nuanced balancing of the fundamental rights of privacy 
and data protection on the one hand, and the right to 
access to documents on the other.68 If access to personal 
data really serves public control of the government, or 
another overriding public interest, and if disclosure 
does not constitute an unjustified interference with the 
right to privacy of the person concerned, it should be 
granted. Kranenborg’s suggestion is in need of further 
elaboration. For instance, it is not clear under what 
circumstances interference would be “unjustified”. 
However, as a starting point for a new way of structuring 
the act of balancing the rights involved, it is welcome.
In Schecke, the Court of Justice does not seem to take into 
consideration the argument from the Strasbourg Court 
that fundamental rights in situations of professional 
activity are given a protection that is weaker than the 
one given in purely personal situations.69 It could be 
argued that the Applicants were not in a purely personal 
situation since they received considerable amounts of 
EU funds for carrying out professional activities. It 
is submitted that such a differentiation between the 
protection of personal data pertaining to private life, 
on the one hand, and personal pertaining to business 
life (even when carried out by individuals), on the 
other, would serve to clarify the stakes when that 
right is to be balanced against the general interest of 
transparency or the right to access to information. In 
Schecke, nevertheless, the Court of Justice omitted to 
adopt such a distinction while referring to the case law 
of the Strasbourg Court.
63 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. See also Satamedia, Opinion of A.G. Kokott of 8 May 2008, paras 50 et seq.
64 See Kranenborg, op.cit., p 1103.
65  Cf. T-233/09, Access Info Europe, Judgment of 22 March 2011, not yet published, para 57.
66  Cf. with T-233/09, Access Info Europe, Judgment of 22 March 2011, not yet published, para 57.
67  See Regulation 1049/2001, Article 6. In Case C-28/08 P Bavarian Lager, paras 58-59, the Court of Justice criticised the General Court’s 
reasoning (in Case T-194/04) on this matter since the General Court reached its conclusions by applying the ECHR and the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court, not taking into consideration specific rules stated in EU law.. See Case C-28/08 P, Bavarian Lager, paras 45–48.
68  Kranenborg, op.cit., pp 1110 and 1094.
69 Cf. Oliver, op.cit., p 1483.
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3  Closing the case… and opening up for  
new questions
In Schecke, the Court of Justice had an opportunity 
to analyse several important questions concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights within EU law, and 
most especially, to interpret articles of the Charter. First 
of all, we can conclude that the Court failed to undertake 
a comprehensive reading of conflicting rights in the 
Charter and to give important guidance as to how these 
rights and principles shall be balanced against each other. 
Secondly, the Court’s judgment could have shed more 
light on how the Charter should be understood in more 
general terms and on its role in EU law. It is clear that 
EU secondary law, as well as national law falling within 
the scope of EU law, must be interpreted in the light 
of the Charter, and that EU legislation that is in breach 
of an article of the Charter should be declared invalid 
under Article 267 TFEU.70 That is also the conclusion 
in Schecke as to the conflict between Articles 7 and 
8 and the secondary legislation in question.71 But the 
Charter also elaborates general principles of EU law.72 
The Charter and the ECHR as interrelated promoters 
of fundamental and human rights were unfortunately 
not discussed in the Court’s assessment. Unfortunately, 
the interrelationship of the Charter, the ECHR, and the 
general principles of EU law as complementary (or 
perhaps, at times, conflicting) sources of primary EU 
law, was not addressed by the Court. It does seem to 
follow from Schecke, however, that a new and stricter 
proportionality test will apply when there are derogations 
from (at least certain) fundamental rights – regardless of 
whether that derogation is due to a national measure or 
an EU measure.
The Court has shown a greater tendency to accept value 
diversity and to leave a certain margin of appreciation 
to the Member States in cases dealing with national 
constitutional traditions not jeopardizing the economic 
goals of the EU.73 Arguably, Treaty developments on the 
protection of fundamental rights signal that the time 
has come for a similarly wide margin of appreciation 
for the Member States in questions concerning human 
rights.74 If a margin of appreciation is allowed, the 
proportionality test must be more lenient. For example, 
if a constitutional value is at stake and the effects of the 
internal market are not that profound, then it is easier 
for the Court to leave room for margin of appreciation. 
However, one has to approach these issues on a case by 
case basis, considering the context of facts, what right 
is being restricted and what kind of aims motivate the 
limitation of the right.75
The Court of Justice refers to Strasbourg case law and, 
by doing so, it finds inspiration and legitimacy for 
its own decisions. But the way this is done has been 
criticised by scholars insofar as the reasoning of the 
Court of Justice is neither coherent nor comprehensive.76 
Though the rights of the ECHR should form an integral 
part of EU law, the Court of Justice does not hesitate 
to hold a different opinion than the Strasbourg Court.77 
Whether or not this will change in the Court of Justice’s 
future case law, as Articles 52(3) and 53 of the Charter 
aim at creating a bridge between the EU legal order and 
the ECHR, remains to be seen.
Arguably, the ruling in Satamedia, while balancing 
two fundamental rights against each other, is a step 
too far away from what (often) is said to be the main 
aim of the EU: the internal market.78 Thus, more cases 
like Satamedia would jeopardize the coherence of 
the internal market, leaving too much of a margin of 
appreciation to the national Courts and the Member 
States.79 These final remarks indicate another more 
profound legal and political question, lurking behind 
the wording used by the Court in its judgments. 
In Schecke, the Court faced a well-known delicate 
situation, as it had to assure that the EU legislators 
comply with primary law and the principles contained 
70  Cf. Article 6(1) TEU. 
71  Schecke, para 89, and para 1 of the Operative Part.
72  Koen Lenaerts and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of law, 
 Common Market Law Review, vol 47, 2010, pp 1629–1669, at p 1656.
73  See, for example, Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, op.cit., p 1666.
74  For an argument to this end drawing on the principle of subsidiarity, see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, op.cit., p 1664, 
 with references.
75  Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, op.cit., p 1666.
76  Guy Harpaz, The European Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The quest for   
enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy, Common Market Law Review, vol 46, 2009, pp 105–141 at pp 109–110.
77  Harpaz, op.cit., p 110. For references dating from before the entry into force of the Charter, see n 35.
78 A similar reasoning can be found in Case C-275/06, ProMusicae v. Telefónica de España, [2008] ECR I-271.
79 Cf Oliver, op.cit., pp 1482–1483.
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therein, while not taking it upon itself to make the 
political, legislative choices that the Treaties confer 
upon the legislator. The closer we move toward the core 
values of the EU, the more intense and present is thus 
the question of how the Court respects the separation 
of powers and a potential hierarchy of norms. With the 
Charter now being legally binding, and the succession 
of the EU to the ECHR pending (further complicating 
an already complicated relationship to the human rights 
regime of the Council of Europe), these questions will 
not cease to gain importance.
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